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Author’s personal right – a right streaming from the vision that the work is the author’s “spiritual child”, declaring that the former should 
be the one who always decides the non-economic fate of the latter, was a significant acquirement of last centuries’ legislation. However, 
international acknowledgement of this right in the Berne Convention and its incorporation in national laws created diversity in its applica-
tion on a country to country basis. One of the most important issues about this right, debatable until today, is the question of its transfer-
ability. Civil and common law approaches disagree about the fact whether third persons should be able to acquire an author’s personal 
right via contractual agreement. The paper will address this issue, discuss the right from historical and comparative perspective, and try to 
come up with the answer whether it is transferable by nature, and whether transferability via contractual arrangement should be allowed.
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Introduction
Freedom to create is one of basic human rights (Roeder, 
1940, p.558) enabling the author to express one’s inner self 
through a particular work (Swack, 1998, p.371). One of the 
main reasons behind creating any work is the author’s de-
sire to share his/her ideas with the audience (Swack, 1998, 
p.371). Thus, it is logical to state that besides economic 
rights related to this work the author should also have a 
right to decide the fate of the work in terms of non-eco-
nomic side of its usage (Hopping B. J. 2007-2008, chapter 
II B). This particular right has already been widely accept-
ed1  and is called the author’s personal right.2 
Universal acknowledgement has not eliminated the 
differences in the application of author’s personal right, is-
sue of its transferability being one of them. The question 
whether this right can belong to any other person besides 
an author, even in case of the author’s express consent, is 
still under debate. 
This work will discuss the above mentioned issue by 
using historical and comparative methods. From historical 
point of view, we shall see the rationale behind the crea-
tion of this right and its development throughout the years. 
From comparative point of view, the paper will show the 
differences between the two main modern approaches – 
civil law and common law ones. Finally, the problem will 
be analized by using both methods and the conclusion will 
be drawn regardin the transferability issue.
Brief History of Evolution of the Author’s Personal 
Right 
The prerequisites of an author’s personal right can be 
first seen in the plagiarism-related laws of Ancient Rome3. 
Plagiarism was also negatively perceived by Christian 
Church due to the moral concept of ownership of intellec-
tual property4 (Swack, 1998, pp.365-370). 
The situation changed in the Catholic Church during 
the Middle Ages, since the church was deemed to own all 
rights over the works created inside it or by its orders. Au-
thors patronized by Catholic Church were, as a rule, work-
ing anonymously and were obliged to obey patrons’ orders 
related to the content of their works (Swack, 1998, pp.365-
370).
The first move towards the current situation was taken 
by acknowledgement of the artists’ rights in Florence. The 
spectrum of rights grew over time and finally, a famous 
Italian artist Michelangelo Buonarotti5  became the first 
artist to be named as author of his own works6.  Beginning 
from this time, works of art were considered to be an “ex-
pression of artist’s personality”, but legal basis for protec-
tion still did not exist (Swack, 1998, pp.365-370).
Author’s personal rights, as they are defined today, 
were first acknowledged in XIX century France (Dillinger, 
2007, p.900). French lawmakers perceived a work as the 
author’s “spiritual child” and established protection crite-
ria according to this conception. French courts played an 
important role in enhancing this protection7 (Hopping B. J. 
2007-2008, chapter III A).
Acknowledgement of personal rights took a different 
pass in Great Britain (and consequently in all common 
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law countries), where Anne’s Statute of 1709 first estab-
lished copyright laws (Gallia, 2007, p.235). However, this 
right was closely connected to the economic interest for 
the creation of the work (Gallia, 2007, p.236). As a result, 
common law countries did not consider acknowledging an 
author’s personal right for a long time.
The first international acknowledgement of an author’s 
personal right was their incorporation in the article 6b of 
the Berne Convention (Dillinger, 2007, p.902). Nowadays, 
the author’s personal right is acknowledged in many coun-
tries of the world at least at some extent.
Rationale behind Acknowledgement of the Author’s 
Personal Right
At first, an author’s personal right was recognized 
in order to protect the author’s economic interests and to 
support the development of culture (Gallia, 2007, pp.234-
235). Thanks to French law, these two interests were joined 
with the interest of protection of the author’s personality 
(Dillinger, 2007, pp.900-901). As time passed a wide spec-
trum of economic rights were created in order to protect 
the author’s commercial interests, while personal rights 
retained the function of protecting author’s personality and 
the public.
In order to protect author’s personality, a creator of 
a particular artistic work has a right to decide the fate of 
its own creation despite its economic value or usefulness 
to society (Swack, 1998, p.366). Since the work is con-
sidered to be the external expression of the author’s in-
ner self (Swack, 1998, p.361) it should be protected from 
the impact which substantively changes its appearance or 
contents (Dillinger, 2007, p.900). Often the public knows 
the author only through his/her works. Thus, by protect-
ing the work, the author’s personality and vision also gets 
protected. This concept is relevant not only during author’s 
lifetime, but also after death (Dillinger, 2007, p.900).
As for the defence of public interest, an author’s per-
sonal right makes it possible to preserve any work for future 
generations in an authentic way without changes (Swack, 
1998, pp.361-362 and Hopping B. J. 2007-2008, Chapter 
II A). Since works protected by the author’s personal right 
are directed towards a specific audience, protecting this 
right means protecting the audience. After the first inter-
action with the work and creation of a certain impression 
regarding it, the expectation is that work stays unchanged 
by others in the future (Palmer, 1990, pp.844-848). This 
reasoning is also related to the idea of preserving cultural 
heritage and supporting its development (Swack, 1998, 
pp.363-364).
Author’s Personal Right8  – Breaking Down the Details
The ontent of an author’s personal right differs from 
country to country. Most broadly, it comprises four rights 
(Hopping B. J., 2007-2008, chapter II B): 
a)  Right of Disclosure9.  The author’s right to decide 
without outside pressure when, where and by using which 
form of communication will he/she declare authorship of a 
particular work (Damich, 1988, p.7).
b)  Right of Attribution10.  According to it an author 
can demand to be named as an author of a particular 
work11, to publish the work anonymously or with a pseu-
donym (Damich, 1988, p.24). “The moral right protects the 
identity of the creator as he has chosen it.”  (Roeder, 1940, 
p.562) 
c)  Right of Integrity.12  This enables the author to ban 
third persons from amending or distorting the work with-
out the contest of the former (Hopping B. J., 2007-2008, 
chapter II B).
d)  Right of Retraction.13 An author is empowered 
to amend already publicized work (Hopping B. J., 2007-
2008, chapter II B).
The author is the only one who by the sheer fact of 
being a creator of a particular work has a right to declear 
himself as an author, to amend (or give contest for amend-
ments), and to take the work out of circulation once and 
forever. In case these rights are transferable through a 
contractual agreement, the new owner of these rights will 
be able to realize them without the author’s contest (and 
maybe even against the author’s will). Coming from this 
the transferability issue is directly connected to the ques-
tion whether a person other than the author should have a 
right to exersize the above listed rights. In case of a nega-
tive answer, the issue of transferability needs to be decided 
negatively as well.  
Author’s Personal Right in the Modern World
Since an author’s personal right has no economic char-
acter regulating it has been avoided most of the time.14 
Article 6b of the Berne convention acknowledges two 
components of this right: Right of Attribution and Right of 
Integrity. At the same time this convention does not man-
date acknowledgement of this right from its signatory par-
ties (Dillinger, 2007, p.902). Thus, the content of this right 
significantly differs from one country to another. However, 
two main approaches can be still identified: civil law and 
common law ones.15
Civil Law Approach
This approach was developed on the basis of Kant’s16 
and Heggel’s17  attitude towards intellectual property. Ac-
81
Can we give it away? Transferability of Author’s Personal Rights via Contractual Agreement
Journal of Social Sciences, 1(2):79-84,2012 ISSN:2233-3878
cording to them the final product of intellectual property 
unites two aspects in itself. It is a thing and an external 
expression of author’s ideas (Swack, 1998, p.370). As a 
result this product should have some non-material value 
that should be protected by a right different from economic 
ones. Since this right stems from an author’s personality it 
is automatically considered untransferrable (Swack, 1998, 
p.381).
In European law working on a particular work is not 
enough for the establishment of a copyright on it. The cri-
terium of originality is decisive here.18  Introducing a crit-
erium of originality is a further indication that relationship 
between the author and its work is more than a relationship 
of an owner and a thing.
On the basis of this approach Europe has developed a 
two fold scheme for copyright protection. An author’s eco-
nomic and personal rights are separated.19  The former one 
is transferable and limited in time. The latter is not (Hop-
ping B. J., 2007-2008, chapter III A). An author might not 
have economic rights any more but still retains personal 
rights (Pattarozzi, 2007, p.460).
This approach has been criticized for several reasons. 
First reason deals with Kant’s approach to the author-and-
work relationship. Critics note that after the creation of a 
work it exists independent of its creator and does not “die” 
together with the author. Therefore, considering the two as 
single union is wrong (Palmer, 1990, p.844). Second, the 
ban on transferability is against the principle of free will. 
If the author wishes to transfer personal rights to another 
person, he/she should be entitled to do so (Pattarozzi, 2007, 
p.460). 
Common Law Approach 
This approach is based on a utilitarian theory that fo-
cuses on the possessor of economic rights of a work rather 
than on an author (Pattarozzi, 2007, p.432). The Common 
Law Approach is more interested in society’s demands on 
a particular work than in a relationship between author and 
his/her work (Pattarozzi, 2007, p.431). Here economic in-
terests related to a particular work dominate an author’s 
personal interests. Transferability of personal rights is al-
lowed if society benefits from it (Pattarozzi, 2007, p.433).
After a controversy related to one of Pablo Picasso’s20 
works  common law countries more or less acknowledged 
the existence of an author’s personal right (Hopping B. J., 
2007-2008, chapter IV B). However, the content of this 
right significantly differs from its civil law understanding. 
A good example of this difference is a “works made for 
hire” doctrine which still works effectively in these coun-
tries. According to this doctrine if a copyrighted work is 
performed by order the orderer aquires copyright (both 
economic and personal rights) for this particular work (Pat-
tarozzi, 2007, p.460).
This approach too, has been mainly criticized for two 
reasons. First, an author’s personal right cannot be limited 
by applying a society interest argument since the society 
itself is mostly interested in its protection. This way origi-
nality and the contents of the work will be better preserved 
and society will get an unmutilated version of it (Pattarozzi 
2007, p. 433). Second, this approach makes the personal 
right of an author seem “secondary” and dependent on eco-
nomic rights. However, personal and economic rights are 
separate rights with different natures. As a result transfer-
ability of the latter does not automatically grant the former 
the same character.
Transferability – an Analysis
It is obvious from a historical point of view that the 
author’s personal right was not perceived as transferable 
upon the moment of its creation. But does this mean that 
the right does not have transferable character at all?
In order to answer this question we should look at the 
content and purpose of the right. Despite the different lev-
els of protection, all countries acknowledging the author’s 
personal right agree that the right was designed as an ac-
knowledgement of the author’s personal link to the created 
work. The concept of the work being the author’s “spiritual 
child” served as a stimulus for declaring the author as “the 
parent” and making him/her the sole authority in the issues 
related to “child’s upbringing”. Keeping this concept in 
mind the issue of transferability raises two main questions; 
can a person be an author of a work when he/she did not 
create the work but rather acquired the right to be called 
author from the creator? Should any person except of the 
author be allowed to amend or make substantial21  changes 
to the work without the consent of the latter? 
Coming from the content and purpose of the creation 
of the author’s personal right, the answer to the first ques-
tion should be negative. Authorship is acquired in the mo-
ment of expression of author’s original approach through 
a particular work. The author is an author only because of 
the fact of creation. The right to be named as an author 
(Right of Attribution) is established from the moment of 
creation and by the sole fact of it. It cannot be acquired by 
any other means. 
The fact that a work has its own “life” after creation 
and that it does not “die” together with the author is true. 
However the death of the author does not (and should not) 
revoke authorship. As long as the work exists identity of its 
creator should not be disregarded and only this person has 
a right to be named as the “parent” of it. 
What if the author desires otherwise? The will of an 
author should definitely be respected if the content of the 
right allows it. In case of the right of attribution though, it 
is not possible. The nature of the right itself indicates that 
once it is given to a certain person it should stay with that 
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person forever. Protection of society’s interests plays an 
important role as well; the public has a right to know who 
exactly created a particular piece of work.
The negative answer on the first question naturally 
generates the negative answer for the second one. Amend-
ing a particular work without the author’s consent means 
amending the author’s personality in the eye of public, 
showing the author’s point of view (his/her inner self) from 
a different perspective, when the latter does not desire to 
do so. Giving this right to a third person means intrusion 
not only into the author’s interests but disregarding soci-
ety’s interest as well. Society has a legitimate interest in 
knowing the work as the creator intended to show it.
Having answered both questions negatively the issue 
of transferability should be decided this way as well.
Conclusion
An author’s personal right enables him/her to be 
known as an author as well as protect the work from further 
undesirable changes. It protects the author even when the 
former does not have economic rights any more. This right 
also protects society, since it enables the work to be pre-
served in its original form as a part of a cultural heritage. 
Protection of this right was reasoned by interests of 
both author and society. Because of this fact, personal right 
was deemed to be untransferable from the very beginning. 
Differences between the two types of approaches described 
above are based on the fact that common law countries 
recognized only the author’s economic rights. The concept 
of the author’s personal right was relatively new to them. 
Thus considering this right in a framework similar to eco-
nomic rights could not be avoided. 
The fact that common law countries try to enact norms 
based on two opposing theories in single legal system cer-
tainly creates problems. However, the implementation of 
author’s personal rights in the laws of these countries does 
not create a prerequisite for it becoming transferable. The 
transferability issue should be decided according to the 
content and purpose of this right, and this right can belong 
only to the author. Therefore giving the author’s personal 
right to others via contractual agreements should not be 
allowed. 
1 Since its incorporation in Berne Convention, this right has been 
acknowledged by the majority of signatory countries in one or another 
form.
2 At first introduced in French Law, this right is known as “droit moral”. 
Majority of authors translate it as “moral right”. However, some think 
that the right, according to its contents, is described better by English 
term “Personal Right”. For further information see Palmer, 1990 and  
Roeder, 1940.
3 The author notes that the term “plagiarism” streams from the word 
“plagium” - the crime of stealing a human being – and underlines nega-
tive attitude of authors and society regarding it in Ancient Rome.
5  Plagiarism was deemed to be theft and was punished likewise.
  1475-1564.
6  “By sheer force of reputation, Michelangelo enjoyed then most of 
the rights French artists now legally enjoy under the doctrine of droit 
moral.” Swack gives examples from the biography of Michelangelo to 
clarify that he, unlike other artists, did not obey the orders of patron-
izing noblemen, refused to show his unfinished works even to the Pope 
himself, created the pieces of arts without being ordered and set prices 
for them. This type of behavior was unusual for most of the artists of 
Renaissance period, since during this time legal basis for protection of  
author’s personal rights did not exist, and artists willing to be named as 
the author of his own work would only do so by sheer strengths of own 
reputation. 
7  Three out of four components of an author’s personal rights was estab-
lished by French court.
8  Most of the legal literature puts the term in plural (personal rights). 
However, analysis shows that this is in fact a single right with subdivi-
sions. This view is further supported by Article 17.1 of Georgian Law 
on Copyright and Related Rights which names the right in singular and 
then discusses its different forms (author’s comment). 
9  Le Droit de Divulgation – This right is often discussed with the fellow 
right of withdrawal. This encompasses the author’s right at a certain 
point to not only ban a further distribution of his/her work but extract 
already distributed works from public. According to some authors this 
very right is a part of the “basic four” personal rights of the author 
instead of right of retraction. 
10  Le Droit à la Paternité de L’oeuvre, in legal literature a right known 
as “right of paternity”.
11  This right is expressed in the 1999/08/07 Law of Georgian on 
Copyright and Related Rights, Article 17.1 “a” and “b” and is named 
respectively “right of authorship” and “right to name”. This right also 
encompasses the author’s power to disclaim any work which is not his/
her work.
12  Le Droit au Respect de L’oeuvre.
13  Le Droit de Repentir ou de Retrait.
14  EU’s approach to the issue is a good example of this. Aspects of 
copyright are protected by several directives at the EU level but every 
directive indicates that its sole aim is to regulate economic rights only. 
15 This type of division is provisional, since the desire to harmonize 
legislation pushed many countries to adopt more similar approaches. 
For example, Australia, a common law country, has been internsively 
adopting legislation protecting the author’s personal rights (Pattarozzi, 
2007).
16  Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
17  Freidrich Hegel (1770-1831).
18  This moment is especially evident in EU’s “Database Directive” 
(Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases). The Directive 
distinguishes between two types of databases, one of which possess 
characteristics of originality enough to be protected by copyright, and 
the other which does not satisfy originality criteria, but is still protected 
by so called sui generis right because the author has put a significant 
amount of work in creating this database.
19 Alternatively, in common law, personal rights have never been part of 
copyright. Some authors suggest that copyright perceived only economic 
set of rights from the very beginning, and use phrase “copyright and 
moral (personal) rights” in order to clarify their position. For example, 
Martin Roeder discusses different standards of copyright (author’s eco-
nomic rights) and moral right (personal right) protection.
20  In 1986 one of the Australian Papers published announcement, where 
the owner of “Trois Femmes” (A famous 1959 work of Picasso) offered 
readers to buy parts of this work. The owner, which bought the work on 
an auction for 10000 dollars, intended to cut the work into 500 square 
pieces and sell each piece for 135 dollar. In case of success, other 
works would be sold the same way. The overall negative response over 
this issue played a significant role in acknowledgement of an author’s 
personal right in several common law countries, including the USA. 
(Dillinger, 2007).
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21  Substantial changes modify the style, content or purpose of a par-
ticular work. That way they differ from technical changes, changes that 
any editor is allowed to perform. The difference between substantial 
and technical changes is that the former counts as secure. This is an act 
perceived as an intrusion into author’s right of expression and is banned 
by most legislative acts around the world (See Georgian Constitution, 
Art 23.2).
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